國家興衰 好富翁與壞富翁

In December 2013 the investment manager Ruchir Sharma was on the road in the Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, interviewing locals in connection with upcoming elections. Everywhere he went, people “would angrily reel off to the exact rupee” the price increases for potatoes, ghee and onions over the past five years, Sharma writes in The Rise and Fall of Nations. “Talk of inflation trumped other pressing issues, such as corruption and unemployment.”

2013年12月，投資經理魯奇爾•夏爾馬(Ruchir Sharma)在印度中央邦(Madhya Pradesh)和拉賈斯坦邦(Rajasthan)街頭，就即將開始的選舉採訪當地人。夏爾馬在《國家的興衰》(Rise and Fall of Nations)一書中寫道，他所到之處，人們都“憤怒地念叨着（過去5年土豆、酥油和洋蔥的價格）具體上漲了多少盧比……有關通脹的聲音蓋過了其他緊迫問題，例如腐敗和失業。”

Inflation is one of 10 criteria used by Sharma, head of emerging markets and chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley Investment Management in New York, to assess the prospects of nations big and small. It is a problem, he writes, because it kills growth by discouraging saving, raising the cost of capital and contributing to political instability.

夏爾馬是摩根士丹利投資管理公司(Morgan Stanley Investment Management)在紐約的新興市場主管和全球首席策略師。通脹是他用來評估各個國家（不管大小）前景的10個標準之一。他寫道，通脹是個問題，因爲它會遏制儲蓄、提高資金成本並導致政治不穩定，從而扼殺增長。

As Sharma’s insights into Indian onion prices suggest, there is nothing theoretical or abstract about his work. His new book adopts the approach that served him well in his 2012 survey of emerging markets, Breakout Nations, considering the views of village barbers alongside those of presidents as he works out whether the fundamentals of the countries he considers suggest a more bearish or bullish stance. For the most part, it is the former that prevails. Sharma notes that when the global financial crisis struck in 2007, more than 60 nations were growing at rates of at least 7 per cent a year; today, a mere nine countries can make that claim.

正如夏爾馬對印度洋蔥價格的洞見所顯示的那樣，他的工作絲毫不涉及高深的理論，也絲毫不抽象。他的新書沿用了2012年，他在寫作關於新興市場的著作《一炮走紅的國家》(Breakout Nations)時行之有效的方法，在判斷研究對象國的基本面因素意味着更悲觀還是更樂觀的前景時，既考慮鄉間理髮師的看法，又考慮企業總裁的意見。他得出，大多數對象國的前景是悲觀的。夏爾馬指出，2007年全球金融危機爆發時，有60多個國家的年增速達到或超過7%；如今這樣的國家只有9個。

Sharma is particularly bearish about the prospects for China, which performs poorly on the metric of debt. For him this is the most critical factor determining economic performance in the short to medium term: if it grows faster than gross domestic product over a sustained period of time, expect an economic slowdown. Sharma was sounding this warning at least two years ago, well before such fears became fashionable.

夏爾馬對於中國的前景尤其悲觀，從債務的標準來看，中國的表現很糟。對他來說，債務是決定中短期經濟表現的最重要因素：如果債務增速長期超過國內生產總值(GDP)增速，經濟放緩也就不遠了。夏爾馬至少兩年前就發出這一警告了，遠在有關債務的擔憂四處瀰漫開之前。

Perhaps the most compelling chapter is the one on “good billionaires” and “bad billionaires”. Good billionaires are those who create jobs and products, thus supporting future economic growth — examples include the founders of Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent in China and the Silicon Valley moguls in the US. By contrast, bad billionaires are those who have made their fortunes through political connections and corruption, obtaining licences to natural resources or real estate.

或許最引人入勝的章節是講述“好億萬富翁”和“壞億萬富翁”的那一章。好億萬富翁可以創造就業和產品，從而支持未來的經濟增長，中國的阿里巴巴(Alibaba)、百度(Baidu)和騰訊(Tencent)的創始人以及美國的硅谷大亨都是這樣的例子。相比之下，壞億萬富翁是通過政治關係和腐敗（獲取自然資源或房地產許可）致富的。

Russia is the face of the bad billionaire model — among its 104 billionaires (the third-largest number after China, with 596, and the US, with 537), 70 per cent of wealth comes from politically connected activities such as oil and gas. Russia is therefore a prime candidate for a backlash against growing inequality. “It is the rise of an entrenched class of bad billionaires in traditionally corruption-prone and unproductive industries that is most likely to choke off growth,” Sharma writes.

俄羅斯是壞億萬富翁模式的代表，在該國104名億萬富翁（數量排名第三，落後於中國（596人）和美國（537人））中，70%的財富來自政治相關活動，例如油氣。因此俄羅斯反抗日益加劇的不平等最合適不過了。夏爾馬寫道：“根深蒂固的壞億萬富翁階層出現在一向有腐敗傾向且生產率低下的行業，最有可能扼殺增長。”

Less predictably, Japan comes in for criticism here precisely because of its lack of billionaires. Indeed, the share of GDP held by this class is a mere 2 per cent. “One cannot help but suspect this is a symptom of the economy’s chronic incapacity to create significant wealth,” Sharma notes, suggesting that the failure is a mark of “a corporate and political culture that rewards seniority more than merit and risk taking.” Growth can slow when inequality is very low as well as very high.

較爲出人意料的是，日本在這方面受到批評，其原因恰恰是該國缺少億萬富翁。實際上，日本億萬富翁僅掌握該國GDP的2%。夏爾馬指出：“人們禁不住猜測，這是該國經濟長期無法創造鉅額財富的表現，”他暗示，這種失敗標誌着“企業和政治文化更多地獎勵資歷，而非才能和冒險。”不平等程度很低和很高時，經濟增速都可能會放緩。

India also doesn’t fare particularly well, primarily because of its low rating on Sharma’s fourth metric, which looks at how heavy a hand the government places on the economy. (France, unsurprisingly, turns out to be “the rotund king of this class”.) In India’s case, the pessimism lies in the fact that the government owns about 70 per cent of the banking system.

印度的表現也不是特別好，主要是因爲它在夏爾馬提出的第四個標準中評分很低，這個標準是政府在多大程度上干預經濟。（毫不令人意外的是，法國在這項排名中位居榜首。）在印度的例子裏，人們的悲觀看法源於下列事實：印度政府擁有銀行業70%的股權。

There are nations whose prospects are less bleak. Sharma is relatively optimistic about the US, because of its deep trade links, strong manufacturing and technology, and good billionaires such as Bill Gates. (On the debit side, the US also has an expensive currency, a high level of debt and the threat of angry populism.) He is also positive about Germany and some of the countries in its economic orbit, such as the Czech Republic and Romania.

還有一些國家的前景不那麼黯淡。夏爾馬對於美國相對樂觀，因爲它有深厚的貿易紐帶、強大的製造業和科技，還有比爾•蓋茨(Bill Gates)等好億萬富翁。（不利方面是，美國也擁有昂貴的貨幣，債務高企，還面臨憤怒民粹主義的威脅。）他還對德國以及在德國經濟軌道內的一些國家感到樂觀，例如捷克和羅馬尼亞。

All these views are not meant to be written in stone: Sharma believes that long-term forecasting is a fool’s game. But for insights into the forces operating in our world today, The Rise and Fall of Nations is a stimulating and useful guide.

所有這些觀點都不是恆久不變的：夏爾馬認爲，做長期預測是傻瓜乾的事情。但關於哪些因素在我們當今這個世界起作用，《國家的興衰》一書是一本振奮人心且頗爲有用的指南。