市值飆升1.8萬倍 巴菲特掌控伯克希爾的這50年是如何做到的

Most companies put out one annual report. Berkshire Hathaway in effect posted two today, which when printed will have just one gold-colored cover, signifying a Golden Anniversary.

大多數公司一年僅發佈一份年報。然而，前幾天，伯克希爾哈撒韋公司實際上發佈了兩份“年報”，它們共用一張金色封面，標誌着巴菲特執掌伯克希爾哈撒韋50週年。

The first report is for 2014: a good year, says CEO Warren Buffett, 84, but hardly perfect (we’ll get to that).

第一份報告是伯克希爾哈撒韋的2014年年報。現年84歲的首席執行官巴菲特表示，2014年公司的表現不錯，但算不上完美（我們後面將講到這一問題）。

The second report covers Buffett’s 50 years of managing Berkshire. He lays out the company’s “past, present and future” in a special section that could have been subtitled (though it wasn’t) “Mistakes I Made.” Berkshire vice-chairman Charles Munger, who has never before written for the annual report, contributes his own cerebral appraisal of his colleague’s tenure, attributing part of Berkshire’s success to Buffett’s “constructive peculiarities.” Here’s one he lists: “Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza.”

第二份“報告”則盤點了巴菲特執掌伯克希爾的半個世紀。在一個專門的章節——致股東信裏，巴菲特勾畫了伯克希爾的“過去、現在和未來”，這個章節簡直可以命名爲“我犯過的錯誤”（當然實際名稱並非如此）。此前從未參與過“致股東信”撰寫的伯克希爾副董事長查理o芒格，也對老搭檔這50年來的表現進行了理性的評估，稱伯克希爾的成功，要部分歸功於巴菲特的“建設性特質”。 芒格列出的其中一條特質是“巴菲特決定將自己的（投資）活動限定在少數幾個種類，並50年如一日的高度專注這幾個種類，這一點難能可貴。”

Here’s another lollapalooza, brought into public view by a quiet change in the report. To the performance table that has always contained only Berkshire’s book value per share and the S&P 500 index, Buffett has added the historical record of Berkshire’s stock price.

伯克希爾年報不聲不響的進行了一處改動，公衆因此注意到另一件難能可貴的事情。過去，年報業績表中僅包含伯克希爾的每股賬面價值以及標普500指數，如今，巴菲特新增了一項——伯克希爾的歷史股價。

And there the record is, on the page facing Buffett’s shareholder letter: 50 years of percentage increases and declines in Berkshire’s stock, followed by two summations. For the half-century—for all the years of Buffett’s management—the price grew at a compound annual rate of 21.6%. The gain, overall, was 1,826,163%.

緊挨着巴菲特致股東信的那一頁上，列出了50年來伯克希爾股價的漲跌幅，後面還附有兩句總結。在巴菲特執掌伯克希爾的半個世紀裏，該公司股價複合年增長率爲21.6％，市值總漲幅爲1,826,163%。

Quick note here: I, the writer of this article, have been a Berkshire shareholder for most of those years and still am. I have also been a friend of Buffett’s for more than 45 years and am the pro bono editor of his annual letter to shareholders.

需要說明的是，筆者多年來一直是伯克希爾的股東，而且目前仍持有該公司股票。此外，我與巴菲特是近50年的老朋友，並無償爲其年度致股東信擔任編輯。

About that remarkable overall gain: Though the statistic was always slated to be in the performance table, the first draft of Buffett’s letter did not include it because that would have seemed like, well, bragging. But the omission also left one early paragraph making no sense. In time, Buffett faced up to logic and put the 50-year percentage into the letter.

關於上述高得驚人的總漲幅：雖然該統計數值一直準備呈現在業績表中，但巴菲特致股東信的初稿中並未提到該數值，因爲談這個似乎有吹牛之嫌。不過，不提它的話，之前一個段落就顯得不知所云。最終，巴菲特決定爲了邏輯流暢，將50年總漲幅的數值加進了致股東信。

There’s an inside story as to why Berkshire’s stock history has at this late date been inserted in the report, those reasons having to do with where the company has been and where it now is. Historically, after the hedge fund called Buffett Partnership Ltd. took control of Berkshire in 1965, Warren Buffett looked for a performance yardstick and decided that every year the company would publicly compare the rise or fall of its per-share book value to the S&P 500 index with dividends included.

至於說爲何等到現在，纔將伯克希爾的歷史股價加入公司年報，則另有內情，這牽涉到伯克希爾公司的歷史與現狀。歷史上，名爲巴菲特合夥公司的對衝基金在1965年掌握伯克希爾的控制權後，巴菲特試圖找到一個業績衡量標準，他決定，每年公開將伯克希爾每股賬面價值的漲跌與含分紅的標普500指數走勢進行對比。

For a number of years, that comparison made sense because Berkshire’s business was predominantly two things: insurance and, with the money made available by insurance, investments in common stocks. The values of these stocks were marked to market every quarter, and so, in effect, was their dollar contribution to book value. That made book a rational comparative to the S&P index. In an important additional fact, book value was then also fairly close to what Buffett calls the “intrinsic value” of Berkshire—that is, an estimate of the company’s true worth, regardless of what its financial statements indicate it to be.

早些年，上述比較合乎情理，因爲當時伯克希爾公司主要從事兩項業務：一是保險，二是將保險資金用於投資普通股。所投資的股票每季度按市值計算價值，所以其價值即其貢獻的賬面價值。因此，將賬面價值與標普500指數作比較很有道理。此外，還有一個重要的事實，那就是此時的賬面價值，非常接近巴菲特所說的伯克希爾的“內在價值”，即與財報好壞無關的公司真實估值。

Then, in the early 1970s, Berkshire slowly but very significantly changed its business strategy. It still made huge investments, true, but also began to purchase, in their entirety, operating companies. Among the first of these were the Buffalo News and Blue Chip Stamps, and they were just the opening shots: Berkshire has never since stopped buying companies nor suppressed its ambitions of buying big.

隨後，在上世紀70年代初，伯克希爾慢慢顯著改變了自身經營策略。沒錯，該公司仍然進行大手筆投資，但也開始全資收購企業。布法羅新聞和Blue Chip Stamps是伯克希爾早期收購的兩家企業，這只是伯克希爾打響的第一槍：自那以來，該公司從未停止收購企業，也沒有壓制自身大手筆收購的野心。

So what do you have after decades of acquisitions? You have Buffett unequivocally declaring: “Berkshire is now a sprawling conglomerate, constantly trying to sprawl further.”

那麼，在連續數十年大舉收購後，伯克希爾的業務版圖如何？巴菲特明確表示：“如今的伯克希爾，是一個龐大的企業集團，並時刻伺機進一步擴張。”

Berkshire is likewise the fourth largest company on the Fortune 500, with annual revenues of about $195 billion. Most of that intake comes not from investments but from more than 70 operating companies Berkshire has bought, among them such heavyweights as railroad Burlington Northern Santa Fe, Berkshire Energy (formerly called MidAmerican Energy), auto insurer GEICO, and half of ketchup purveyor Heinz.

在《財富》美國500強榜單上，伯克希爾位列第四，年營收約1950億美元。其中大部分收入並非投資回報，而是來自其收購的70多家企業，其中的重量級選手包括伯靈頓北方聖達菲鐵路、原名中美能源的伯克希爾能源、汽車保險公司GEICO以及伯克希爾掌握半數股份的番茄醬廠商亨氏。

That large-scale shift to buying businesses not only rocketed Berkshire’s size, but also raised a big question (never discussed in the annual report, but occasionally raised at the company’s annual meeting) as to what its performance yardstick should be. Under GAAP accounting standards, the cost of an acquired company is never revalued upward, which means any post-acquisition rise in that company’s intrinsic value never pumps up book value. So Berkshire’s book value became in time both an anemic figure and a poor indicator of how well the company was doing. In a corollary result, the comparison with the S&P 500 grew meaningless.

大舉收購企業的轉變，不僅令伯克希爾的規模迅速膨脹，也提出了一個大問題（該問題此前在公司年報中從未提及，但在公司年會上偶爾會被提出），即該公司應該用什麼作爲業績衡量標準。根據一般公認會計原則（GAAP），被收購公司的成本永遠不會調高，這就意味着，該公司內在價值在被收購後提升，不會推高賬面價值。因此，伯克希爾的賬面價值增長緩慢，而且無法準確反映該公司的高速發展。因此，與標普500指數作對比就變得毫無意義。

So why didn’t Buffett just explain the situation to his shareholders and do away with the comparison?

那巴菲特爲何不向股東說明情況，並停止與標普500指數作對比？

One reason, surely, is that more than 30 years ago, in his 1982 annual letter, Buffett derided businesspeople who set targets and then, confronted with unsatisfactory results, simply change the target. What those people do, Buffett said, is “shoot the arrow of business performance into a blank canvas and then carefully draw the bullseye around the implanted arrow.”

原因之一是，30多年前，巴菲特在1982年的致股東信中，嘲笑有些商界人士在業績不理想時，就更改此前設定的目標。巴菲特稱，這種做法，無異於“先將經營績效之箭射入白布，然後小心翼翼的圍繞射入的箭來畫靶心。”

The new performance table in the annual report comes across as a sort of yardstick compromise. The S&P 500 results are still there—and indeed look like a set of targets that haven’t recently been hit. In all but one of the last five years (the exception was 2011), the S&P beat Berkshire’s book value. In 2014, the S&P index was up 13.7% against Berkshire’s rise in book value of 8.3%. Still, for the 50 years, Berkshire was the runaway leader: its book value-per-share was up 751,113% vs. 11,196% for the S&P.

在年報中對業績表做變動，給人的印象是在衡量標準方面做出了妥協。因此，與標普500指數的對比仍然被保留了下來。就此標準而言，伯克希爾近來似乎未能達到原定目標。過去五年來，除2011年以外，標普的表現都擊敗了伯克希爾。2014年，標普500指數上漲了13.7％，而伯克希爾賬面價值僅上漲了8.3％。儘管如此，從整整50年的表現來看，伯克希爾遙遙領先：其每股賬面價值上漲了751,113%，而標普上漲了11,196%。

And both of those figures pale, of course, against Berkshire’s market value rise of 1,826,163%.

當然，兩者都大大低於伯克希爾市值1,826,163%的漲幅。

A characteristic of that rise, Buffett says, is that it is “roughly equal” to the 50-year rise of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Unfortunately for the curiosity of investors, that declaration doesn’t exactly undo Buffett’s longstanding refusal to divulge his estimates of intrinsic value. But since Berkshire’s market price has unquestionably grown enormously, his statement does certify that intrinsic value has done likewise. The stock market agrees: It currently accords Berkshire a market cap of about $367 billion, third-highest in the U.S., after Apple (at a commanding $770 billion) and Exxon (at just under $380 billion).

巴菲特稱，伯克希爾市值漲幅的特點是，其“基本等於”這50年來該公司內在價值的漲幅。可惜，儘管投資者十分好奇，但上述表態並未真正打破巴菲特拒絕泄漏其對內在價值估算的傳統。但由於伯克希爾的市價已巨幅增長，巴菲特的說法確實證明，該公司的內在價值同樣已經大大提高。股市對此表示贊同：目前，伯克希爾的市值約3670億美元，是美國市值第三高的企業，僅次於蘋果（市值高達7700億美元）和埃克森美孚（市值略低於3800億美元）。

And now switch your mind from the gigantic figures of the 50-year panorama to what Buffett called the “good year” of 2014. Berkshire’s revenues for the year were up 6.9%; its earnings per share, though, rose by only 2%, to $12,092 (against Class A shares that have recently been hovering above $223,000). Even so, that small rise in earnings certainly wasn’t what Buffett had in mind when he said 2014 had its problems. He has always rejected earnings-per-share as having any relevance to Berkshire’s results, since they do not include unrealized capital gains and losses, which book value does include.

現在，我們將注意力從高得驚人的50年總漲幅，轉向巴菲特所說的“表現不錯”的2014年。伯克希爾的收入在2014年上漲了6.9％，不過，同期每股收益僅上漲了2％，至1.2092萬美元（最近，該公司A類股的股價在每股22.3萬美元左右徘徊）。不過，當巴菲特稱2014年並不完美時，他所指的肯定不是每股收益漲幅較低這一問題。巴菲特一直認爲，每股收益與伯克希爾的業績毫無相關性，因爲每股收益不包含未實現的資本損益，而賬面價值則包括資本損益。

The core of Buffett’s dissatisfactions in 2014 was Berkshire’s biggest non-insurance company, railroad BNSF. It managed, yes, to increase earnings by a bit. But BNSF ran into countless operating difficulties that delayed grain, coal, and fertilizer shipments and, says Buffett, “disappointed many of its customers.” Buffett’s review of BNSF’s problems had a scolding tone, unusual for his annual report. He also resorted to italics to declare that BNSF must do “whatever it takes” to restore top-grade service. “Whatever it takes” will include record capital expenditures, now underway. (For more on BNSF, click here.)

巴菲特2014年最不滿意的，是伯克希爾旗下最大的非保險公司——伯靈頓北方聖達菲鐵路。沒錯，該公司的收益略有增長。但鐵路運營困難重重，導致穀物、煤炭和化肥出貨延誤，巴菲特稱“令許多顧客失望不已”。巴菲特在回顧伯靈頓北方聖達菲鐵路的問題時，流露出責備之意，這在其年度報告中很少見。他還用斜體字寫道，伯靈頓北方聖達菲鐵路必須“不惜一切代價”恢復一流服務。“一切代價”將包括目前正在進行的創紀錄的資本支出。

Despite BNSF’s troubles, what Buffett calls Berkshire’s non-insurance “Powerhouse Five”—the railroad, Berkshire Hathaway Energy (BHE), toolmaker Iscar, chemical company Lubrizol, and manufacturing conglomerate Marmon—raised their pretax profits by nearly 15%. A complete earnings picture for BNSF and BHE is given in the annual report—their combined pretax earnings climbed by 11%—but the profits of the other companies are not, for competitive reasons, disclosed.

儘管存在一定問題，但被巴菲特稱爲伯克希爾公司非保險業務“五大引擎”的伯靈頓北方聖達菲鐵路、伯克希爾-哈撒韋能源、模具製造商伊斯卡公司、化工企業路博潤以及製造業巨頭Marmon，稅前利潤增長了近15％。年報中給出了伯靈頓北方聖達菲鐵路以及伯克希爾-哈撒韋能源的完整收益情況，兩者的稅前收益攀升了11％，但其他幾家公司的利潤，出於競爭方面的原因，都未披露。

On the insurance side of Berkshire, “float”—insurance premiums intended to in time cover claims and expenses, but that in the interim are usable for other purposes—kept climbing, from $77 billion at the end of 2013 to $84 billion. That leaves Buffett wrong in his prediction a year ago that continuing gains in float were unlikely; he reasoned then that float would be diminished by certain “run-off” reinsurance contracts that Berkshire had on its books. He was right to an extent, but other parts of Berkshire’s insurance businesses picked up the slack. Buffett is happy to have been wrong.

在伯克希爾的保險業務方面，“備用款”，即打算屆時用於支付理賠款和開支但其間可用於其他用途的保險費，規模不斷攀升，從2013年年底的770億美元，增至840億美元。一年前，巴菲特曾預測，備用款金額不可能持續攀升，如今看來，這一預測是錯誤的。巴菲特當時提出的理由是，伯克希爾賬上某些再保險合同“流”，將使得“備用款”規模減小。在某種程度上，上述看法是對的，但伯克希爾其它的保險業務彌補了差額。巴菲特很高興自己判斷錯了。

The gains in float, Berkshire’s general prosperity, and the non-appearance of what Buffett sometimes calls an “elephant” acquisition left the company holding $63 billion in cash at the end of the year (up from $48 billion a year earlier). Buffett would class his failure to bag an elephant as just that, a failure. Still, it is hard to think of Berkshire’s huge holdings of cash as disastrous.

備用款增加、伯克希爾旗下公司業務全面繁榮，加之沒有出現巴菲特所說的“重量級”收購，截止2014年年底，伯克希爾坐擁630億美元現金（就在一年前，該數字爲480億美元）。巴菲特將未能收購大型企業視爲失敗。不過，伯克希爾持有鉅額現金，總歸沒有太大的壞處。

Buffett himself speaks of the importance of cash in the 50-year report, writing, “At a healthy business, cash is sometimes thought of as something to be minimized—as an unproductive asset that acts as a drag of such markers as return on equity. Cash, though, is to a business as oxygen is to an individual: never thought about when it is present, the only thing in mind when it is absent.”

在50週年報告中，巴菲特本人也談到了現金的重要性，他寫道：“在一家健康的企業裏，現金有時被認爲應當最小化，被視爲可能拖累股本回報等數據的非生產性資產。然而，現金之於企業，就好比氧氣之於個人：平時被人忘在腦後，一旦少了它，滿腦子想的都是它。”

In 2014, Buffett used some of Berkshire’s “oxygen” to increase its investment in one of its big holdings, IBM. He put an additional $1.5 billion into the stock, raising Berkshire’s total IBM investment to $13.2 billion. He also bought at prices that left Berkshire’s existing cost-per-share, $170, virtually unchanged. Still, his investment in IBM has so far left him in the hole—as the media has wasted no time pointing out. Yesterday, IBM closed at $162.

2014年，巴菲特動用了伯克希爾的一些“氧氣”，以增加對IBM的投資，IBM是伯克希爾重倉持有的企業之一。巴菲特拿出15億美元，投資IBM股票，將伯克希爾對IBM的總投資額推高至132億美元。其買入價幾乎與伯克希爾的現有每股成本（170美元）持平。儘管如此，正如媒體所指出的那樣，巴菲特對IBM的這筆投資目前處於虧損狀態。日前，IBM股票報收於162美元。

Berkshire’s biggest new investment in 2014 was Deere & Co., in which Berkshire’s annual report shows the company to have put nearly $1.3 billion. By year-end, Berkshire had accumulated a small profit in the stock.

2014年，伯克希爾最大一筆新投資是迪爾公司，伯克希爾的年報顯示，對迪爾公司的投資將近13億美元。截至去年年底，迪爾公司的股票給伯克希爾帶來了薄利。

One person sure to be pleased by the Deere investment is Warren Buffett’s son, Berkshire director Howard Buffett, who is a working farmer and a big admirer of Deere’s farm equipment. Howard (known to family and friends as “Howie”) is also his father’s candidate to become the next chairman of Berkshire when Warren can no longer fill the job. That doesn’t make Howard’s ascension automatic; the board of directors will decide who gets the job. But the chairmanship will then, in any event, strictly be a non-executive position. That is, one person will not be chairman and CEO, as Warren Buffett is today.

有一個人肯定對上述投資感到高興，那就是沃倫o巴菲特之子——伯克希爾董事霍華德o巴菲特。霍華德從事農耕，是迪爾公司農用設備的忠實粉絲。霍華德（親友們稱他爲“豪伊”）也是巴菲特心中伯克希爾下任董事長的候選人之一。當然，霍華德不能直接頂替其父親的職位；待到巴菲特隱退，將由董事會決定其接替者。但是，無論如何，屆時董事長一職將完全成爲非行政職務。也就是說，沒人能像如今的巴菲特這樣，同時擔任董事長和首席執行官。

The question of who will follow Buffett as CEO remains uncertain (if, for no other reason, because this is not a man even remotely thinking about leaving). Even so, Berkshire’s new 50-year report has a fascinating description of what kind of person Buffett thinks should succeed him. Describing the CEO’s job as primarily one of capital allocation and the selection and retention of managers beneath him, Buffett says these duties also require the CEO “to be a rational, calm and decisive individual who has a broad understanding of business and good insights into human behavior.”

誰將接替巴菲特擔任首席執行官一職，如今尚無定論（主要原因在於，巴菲特還完全沒有退隱之意）。即便如此，伯克希爾公司的50年報告中，還是詳細描述了巴菲特認爲其接替者應該是怎樣的人。巴菲特稱，首席執行官的主要工作，在於配置資本、挑選並留住手下的經理人。巴菲特表示，上述職責要求首席執行官“理性、冷靜、果斷，對業務有着全面瞭解，並對人類行爲有着深刻見解”。

Obviously, this is Buffett doing a verbal “selfie.” As a long-time friend of his, I can testify that he fits that description.

顯然，上述描述簡直就是巴菲特的“自畫像”。作爲巴菲特多年的老友，我能證明他本人完全符合上述描述。

I will qualify that just a bit: If his bridge partner—I’ve been there—makes a really ridiculous mistake, he has been known to abandon his calm.

不過，我要補充說明一點：假如打橋牌時他的搭檔（比如在下）犯了低級錯誤，他可一點都不冷靜。（財富中文網）

Until she retired from Fortune last year, Carol Loomis was a senior editor-at-large on the magazine’s staff.

本文作者Carol Loomis曾是《財富》雜誌資深自由編輯，去年從《財富》退休。