美國反對亞投行的理由站不住腳

America’s opposition to China’s creation of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is degenerating into a self-defeating farce. Having failed to prevent western allies from joining the fledgling bank, Washington has been left scowling on the sidelines. The Obama administration’s handling of the issue has been embarrassing — and it may hold ominous portents for Asia and the rest of the world.

美國反對中國創建亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank，簡稱亞投行）的做法，正在弄巧成拙，淪爲一出自己打敗自己的鬧劇。在未能阻止西方盟國加入這家新銀行之後，華盛頓被晾在一邊獨自鬱悶。奧巴馬政府對這個問題的處理令人尷尬——這對亞洲乃至世界其他地區可能是不祥的徵兆。

This week, 57 prospective members assembled in Singapore to devise the rules of the new Beijing-sponsored development institution. Among those attending are US allies such as the UK, France, Germany and South Korea. Aside from Washington, only Canada and Japan have stayed away.

本週，57個準成員國在新加坡開會，擬定這家北京發起的新的發展機構的規則。與會的美國盟友包括英國、法國、德國和韓國。除了美國以外，只有加拿大和日本置身事外。

Since 1945, the US has played a hegemonic role in the world’s financial system, propped by the might of the dollar and the lapidary heft of the Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank and IMF. Top dogs rarely welcome a pushy rival. Surrendering the role of primus inter pares is hard.

自1945年以來，美國以美元的威力和佈雷頓森林機構——世界銀行(World Bank)和國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)——的重量級地位爲依託，一直在世界金融體系中扮演霸權角色。做老大的很少歡迎愛出風頭的對手。放棄掌門人角色是很難的。

But Washington’s principled reasons for opposing the bank do not stack up. True, China’s bilateral lending practices have hardly underpinned its claim to good governance. But it is premature to dismiss the AIIB as Beijing mercantilism writ large.

但華盛頓反對亞投行的原則性理由是站不住腳的。沒錯，中國的雙邊放貸實踐難以支撐其良好治理的說法。但就此將亞投行視爲北京重商主義的體現就過早了。

China is keen to show that it can host a respectable multilateral institution. It has been careful not to politicise the bank. It has put Jin Liqun, an international bureaucrat with experience of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), at its head. His brief has been to apply globally accepted principles of governance.

中國渴望證明，它能夠主持一家受尊敬的多邊機構。迄今中國小心翼翼地不讓亞投行政治化。它已任命在世行和亞洲開發銀行（Asian Development Bank，簡稱亞行）有工作經驗的國際官員金立羣執掌該行。他過去的使命就是實行全球公認的治理原則。

Convincing doubters that the AIIB is not a vehicle for brute Chinese power was never going to be quick or easy. But Mr Jin’s early steps give some confidence. He has for instance recruited widely: roughly half the nascent institution’s employees so far are non-Chinese. And while AIIB has yet to settle upon a final governance structure, Beijing seems willing to give oversight to its other members.

要說服懷疑者相信亞投行不是中國硬實力的工具，從來就不容易。但金立羣的早期舉措讓人產生一定的信心。比如，他進行了廣泛招募：這家新機構迄今大約一半的僱員是非中國籍人士。而且，儘管亞投行還沒有決定最終的治理結構，但北京似乎願意讓其它成員國擁有監督權。

China is understood to favour a 75 per cent-25 per cent voting split between Asian and non-Asian members (with allocations made according to gross domestic product). On the basis of the current membership roll, that would give Beijing about 43 per cent of the votes, according to analysis by Benn Steil and Dinah Walker at the Council for Foreign Relations.

據信中國支持在亞洲和非亞洲成員國之間按照75%/25%的比例安排表決權（然後按照GDP規模進行分配）。根據美國外交關係協會(Council on Foreign Relations)的本•斯泰爾(Benn Steil)和黛娜•沃克(Dinah Walker)所作的分析，按照目前的成員國名冊，這將給予北京大約43%的投票權重。

There are reports that China has forsworn its veto power. If this is the case, then it would be more democratic than the approach taken by the US, which retains a final say at both the IMF and World Bank despite having less than 20 per cent of the votes.

有報道稱，中國承諾放棄否決權。若果真如此，那將比美國採取的方式更爲民主；美國在IMF和世行都保留了最後決定權，儘管投票權重不到20%。

The Obama administration’s reflexive hostility to the establishment of the AIIB risks giving the impression that the US is less interested in Asian development than in restraining Beijing. The US would be unwise to give China further excuses to claim that it is bent on containment.

對於亞投行的成立，奧巴馬政府表現出反射性的敵意，其風險在於給人這樣一種印象，即美國更感興趣的是遏制中國，而不是亞洲的發展。如果美國讓中國有更多借口宣傳美國一門心思要遏制中國，那將是不明智的。

Washington’s stance has relevance to its Asian allies, particularly Japan. Tokyo is understood to be considering joining the AIIB, even though it is already the leading power in the ADB. Rather than leaning on Japan to stay out, the US should realise that the presence of its allies in the AIIB would give its allies a much bigger say in the bank and dilute Chinese voting power.

華盛頓的立場對其亞洲盟國（尤其是日本）來說很重要。東京方面據信正在考慮加入亞投行，即使日本已經是亞行的主導力量。與其繼續施壓日本，要求其不參與亞投行，美國應該意識到，它的盟友加入亞投行將使它們對該行事務有更大發言權，稀釋中國的投票權重。

Far from being a point of contention, the AIIB’s establishment could still turn out to be an example of how China can reinforce the principles that underpin multilateralism in the west. The US has played a poor hand in regard to the AIIB and its allies. The best course would be to acknowledge the mistake and be present at the creation.

不但沒有成爲一個爭論焦點，亞投行的成立可能成爲一個例證，說明中國能否夯實那些支撐西方多邊主義的原則。美國在對待亞投行及自己的盟友方面迄今出牌糟糕。最好的對策是承認錯誤，並參與亞投行的創建。