各大經濟體應該警惕"低利率世界"的風險

It is curious to reflect that when US and UK policy interest rates were cut to their lowest ever levels in March 2009, markets expected them to be on the rise within the year. More than six years later the rates remain the same and the markets are still obsessed with the timing of a rise. When that will happen is as clear as mud in the wake of after the Federal Open Market Committee’s statement last week.

2009年3月英美政策利率被降至其歷史最低水平後，市場預期兩者在當年內就會上升，現在想到這一點讓人費解。6年多過去了，利率一直保持在相同的極低水平，而市場仍糾結於加息時機。在聯邦公開市場委員會(FOMC)上週發表聲明之後，何時加息仍是個未知數。

The one thing that is bIt is beyond doubt that the “normalisation” of monetary policy is a long way off. Janet Yellen, chairwoman of the Federal Reserve, has indicated that when the rises do come they will be small, incremental and predictable. For some years we will be in a subnormal interest rate world.

只有一點毋庸置疑，那就是貨幣政策“正常化”離我們還很遠。美聯儲(Fed)主席珍妮特•耶倫(Janet Yellen，見上圖)表示，當真的開始加息時，加息將是小幅、漸進和可預測的。未來好幾年，我們將生活在一個利息低於正常水平的世界裏。

It will also be a low growth world — witness the downward revisions to growth projections of both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England this month. The eurozone and Japan, despite enjoying the benefits of big competitive devaluations, are struggling to deliver half-decent growth rates.

這也將是一個低增長的世界——看看吧，本月美聯儲和英國央行(BoE)都調低了本國的預期增長率。歐元區和日本儘管享受着大幅競爭性貶值的好處，但仍難以達到像樣的增長率。

And competitive devaluation is anyway a zero sum game that does nothing to boost the global economy. China is slowing palpably even if the official figures are disguising the underlying reality. The post-crisis assumption that emerging market economies would show the developed world a clean pair of heels now no longer holds.

無論如何，競爭性貶值是一種零和遊戲，對提振全球經濟毫無貢獻。中國明顯開始放緩，儘管官方數據掩蓋了根本現實。危機後有關新興市場經濟體將把發達經濟體遠遠拋在後面的假設，如今再也站不住腳。

Against a background of inadequate global demand the collapse in energy and commodity prices has added powerful disinflationary impetus. Wage increases in the developed world, with the notable exception of the UK just recently, have been subdued.

在全球需求不足的背景下，能源與大宗商品價格崩盤增添了強大的通脹減緩動力。發達經濟體的工資增長一直低迷（英國最近出現的情況是個突出的例外）。

Forward markets are telling us that interest rates are going to be muchfar lower than pre-crisis average policy rates since 1945 for the US, UK, the eurozone and Japan, which were respectively 3 per cent, 7 per cent, 3 per cent and 4 per cent.

期貨市場行情告訴我們，未來美國、英國、歐元區和日本的利率將遠低於從1945年至危機爆發那段時期的平均水平，後者分別爲3%、7%、3%和4%。

In other words, the markets are saying that this time is different, a formulation that is reliably dangerous when it comes to predicting the future. Of course, some things really are different. For much of the postwar period most central banks were not independent, though whether independence has been the driving force behind prolonged disinflation is another matter, as is the question of whether central banks will remain independent in future.

換言之，市場在說“這次不一樣”；就預測未來而言，這種說法難免是危險的。當然，有些事情真的不一樣了。戰後很長時期裏，多數央行不是獨立的——儘管央行獨立地位是不是持續通脹減緩的推動因素是另一個問題，而央行未來能不能保持獨立也是一個問題。

Given the quasi-fiscal nature of their activities since the crisis and the risk that unconventional measures pose to their balance sheets, the possibility of a political land-grab in monetary policy is not negligible.

鑑於危機爆發以來各央行的行動帶有“準財政”性質，鑑於非常規政策對央行資產負債表構成的風險，政治插手貨幣政策的可能性是不可忽視的。

On the other hand, liberalisation of labour markets and the decline of union power seems unlikely to be reversed in the short and medium term. Note, though, that with ageing populations, a shrinking workforce may exercise market power to grab higher wages against a retired population that tries to use voting power to secure stable retirement incomes.

另一方面，勞動力市場自由化和工會實力衰退的趨勢看來在短期和中期內不太可能逆轉。不過請注意，在人口老齡化的大背景下，日益減少的勞動力或許會藉助市場實力爭取更高工資，而退休人羣努力利用自己的選票來保住穩定的退休收入。

The dangers inherent in a subnormal interest rate world relate, first, to the accumulation of debt. Debt of almost any size in relation to gross domestic product becomes manageable at today’s negligible interest rates. Whether it stays manageable depends on whether politicians seize the opportunity to deliver structural reforms and infrastructure investment to enhance growth, without which debts cannot ultimately be serviced.

在利率低於正常水平的世界，其內在危險首先與債務積累有關。以如今可忽略的利率水平，債務相對於國內生產總值(GDP)的規模無論有多大，都是可管理的。至於債務未來能不能保持可管理，則取決於政界人士能否抓住機遇，推行結構性改革，並投資於基礎設施，以推動經濟增長。若非如此，債務最終將無法償還。

The snag is that low growth makes it hard to summon up the political will for reform, which tends to impede growth in the short run before producing a longer-term pay-off.

麻煩在於，低增長使人很難調動起改革的政治意志——改革傾向於在短期內壓抑增長，之後才能帶來長期回報。

Then there is the problem of dismal investment returns and the impact of low discount rates on pension fund liabilities. It is impossible to know how far pension fund deficits dampenen animal spirits in the boardroom, but where pension funds are big in relation to the company, deficits cannot help.

還有就是投資回報糟糕以及低折現率加重養老基金支付負擔的問題。我們不可能知道，養老基金的虧空將在多大程度上抑制董事會的“動物精神”，但在養老金規模相對於公司較大的情況下，虧空肯定不是好事。

They may well have been a factor, albeit a minor one, in the weakness of investment since 2008. Equally important, a subnormal interest rate environment reduces the scale of creative destruction and confers advantage on big companies at the expense of more productive smaller companies that lack good access to credit markets.

對於2008年以來投資疲弱的情況，養老基金虧空很可能是一個因素，儘管是個次要因素。同等重要的是，利率偏低的環境影響了“創造性破壞”的規模，把優勢留給了大公司，卻損害了生產率較高、但難以利用信貸市場的中小企業。

In such a world any reversion to the historic interest rate mean is distant. There is no generalised sword of Damocles hanging over the heavily indebted developed world for the momentnow. Yet for individual countries an early reversion may be the reward for bad policy. Japan and southern Europe are the laboratories in which this hypothesis will be tested.

在這樣一個世界裏，利率迴歸歷史均值是非常遙遠的事。目前而言，負債累累的發達經濟體頭上並未普遍懸掛着一柄達摩克利斯之劍。不過，對個別國家來說，較早迴歸是對糟糕政策的獎勵。日本和南歐國家將是驗證這一命題的實驗室。

The writer is an FT columnist

本文作者爲英國《金融時報》專欄作家