調查報告稱福島核事故爲"人爲災難"

The crisis at the Fukushima nuclear plant was "a profoundly man-made disaster", a Japanese parliamentary panel has said in a report.

日本國會福島核事故調查委員會近日公佈調查報告，稱福島核事故“完全是人爲災難”。

The disaster "could and should have been foreseen and prevented" and its effects "mitigated by a more effective human response", it said.

報告稱，“有關人員本應預見到這起事故並予以避免”，而事故的後果“也本應通過更有效的應對措施得以緩解”。

The report catalogued serious deficiencies in both the government and plant operator Tepco's response.

報告將政府以及負責核電站經營的東京電力公司的嚴重應對失誤進行了分類。

It also blamed cultural conventions and a reluctance to question authority.

報告還指責了日本的文化傳統，以及人們不願意質詢當局的習慣。

The six-reactor Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant was badly damaged after the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami knocked out cooling systems to reactors, leading to meltdowns and the release of radioactivity.

2011年3月11日的日本強震及海嘯摧毀了核反應堆的冷卻系統，使擁有6座核反應堆的福島第一核電站損毀嚴重，導致堆芯熔燬，引發輻射物質泄漏。

Tens of thousands of residents were evacuated from an exclusion zone around the plant as workers battled to bring reactors under control. Tepco declared the reactors stable in December 2011.

核電站附近隔離區的數萬名居民被迫疏散，工作人員盡力控制住核反應堆的狀況。去年11月，東京電力宣佈核反應堆狀態穩定。

Members of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission were appointed to examine the handling of the crisis and make recommendations.

日本國會去年12月設立福島核事故調查委員會，負責調查覈危機的處理情況，並提出建議。

The investigation included 900 hours of hearings and interviews with more than 1,000 people.

調查委員會進行了900個小時的聽證，傳喚了超過一千人。

In the panel's final report, its chairman said a multitude of errors and wilful negligence had left the plant unprepared for the earthquake and tsunami.

委員會主席在最終報告中指出，大量失誤和有意忽略使得核電站無法承受地震和海嘯的衝擊。

"Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster," it said.

報告說：“儘管由地震海嘯引發，但隨後發生在福島第一核電站的事故卻不能被認爲是自然災害。”

"It was a profoundly man-made disaster - that could and should have been foreseen and prevented."

“這完全是人爲災難，應該提前預見到並加以防範。”

After six months of investigation, the panel concluded that the disaster "was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and Tepco" founded in the failure of regulatory systems.

在調查6個月後，委員會得出結論認爲，由於監管體系存在問題，這起災難“是政府、監管者和東京電力公司共同導致的”。

It said that the situation at the plant worsened in the aftermath of the earthquake because government agencies "did not function correctly", with key roles left ambiguous.

報告指出，地震後核電站的情況惡化是由於政府機構“應對不得力”，但沒有指明關鍵人物。

It also highlighted communication failures between Tepco and the office of then Prime Minister Naoto Kan, whose visit to the site in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake "diverted" staff.

報告還強調指出，東京電力公司和日本首相菅直人辦公室之間溝通不暢，菅直人在地震後立即前往現場使工作人員“分心”。