財經社會: 日本央行的"偷襲珍珠港"戰略

Japan’s history is full of moments when the elites rallied around a dramatic shift in strategy. In 1868, its leaders ditched hundreds of years of feudalism in response to the threat of western colonialism. In 1945, they abandoned the pursuit of “greatness” via military means and set diligently about the task of achieving economic prosperity. Now, after 15 years of deflation, Japan’s leadership has dramatically reversed course again by going hell for leather for inflation. In strategic terms, the sudden shift is reminiscent of the notorious attack on Pearl Harbor.

在日本歷史上，精英階層團結一致大幅改變戰略立場的時刻比比皆是。1868年，日本領導人爲應對西方殖民主義的威脅，拋棄了奉行數百年之久的封建主義。1945年，日本領導人放棄了利用武力來追求“偉大”的做法，轉而致力於實現經濟繁榮的使命。今天，在國民經濟經歷了15年通縮之後，日本領導人再次大幅轉向，開始全力推行通脹政策。就戰略而言，這種突然轉向不由得讓人想起臭名昭著的偷襲珍珠港行動。

Readers may consider the comparison to be in poor taste. Precious lives will not be lost as a result of an expansion of the monetary base, however dire the warnings from alarmists who say it will lead to hyperinflationary ruin. Yet there are interesting parallels. By 1941, Japan’s war planners thought conflict with the US was inevitable. In July that year, Washington had imposed an oil embargo on Japan in response to its invasion of French Indochina. Tokyo decided it needed to grab control of oil in the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia – an assault that, it guessed, would inevitably draw the US into the war. In other words, conflict with Washington was coming. Better to pre-empt it in the hope of gaining significant strategic advantage through a surprise attack.

讀者可能會認爲，這種類比並不得體。貨幣基礎的擴張並不會讓人們喪失寶貴的生命，無論那些認爲這種擴張將導致惡性通脹的人說得多麼危言聳聽。但二者確有一些有趣的相似之處。1941年時，日本的戰爭策劃者認爲與美國發生衝突是不可避免的。當年7月，美國政府爲應對日本入侵法屬印度支那，宣佈對日本實施石油禁運。日本政府認定，有必要把荷屬東印度羣島（如今的印尼）的石油控制在手裏。它推測，如果對荷屬東印度羣島發動襲擊，將不可避免地把美國拖入戰爭。換言之，與美國的衝突很快就會到來。日本認爲最好先發制人，以期通過偷襲來獲得重大的戰略優勢。

Something of the same calculation is going on when it comes to inflation. The logic goes a bit like this: Japan’s current fiscal position is unsustainable; you cannot borrow half of what you spend indefinitely, particularly when your working population – and thus your likely tax base – is going to shrink indefinitely; Japan’s population, currently 127m, will fall to 108m by 2050.

在某種程度上，通脹政策有着同樣的考慮。這裏面的邏輯似乎是這樣的：日本當前的財政狀況是不可持續的；不可能永遠靠舉債來維持一半的支出，尤其是在勞動力人口（也就是潛在稅基）無限萎縮的情況下；日本目前的總人口爲1.27億，到2050年時將降至1.08億。

Thus some sort of debt crunch is coming. With more than 90 per cent of debt held internally, however, future governments are unlikely to default outright. Far more plausibly, they will resort to the printing presses. And if the endgame is inflation anyway, surely it is better to get the boot in first. As with Pearl Harbor, the hope is that by beating the enemy to the punch, one stands a chance of gaining the upper hand.

如此一來，就會導致某種形式的債務危機。但鑑於日本逾90%的國債是由國內民衆持有的，未來的日本政府不太可能採取顯性的違約。更有可能的是，他們會求助於印鈔機。如果不管怎樣結局都是通脹，那麼顯然還是儘早進入通脹爲好。就珍珠港事件而言，日本人希望的是，若能先發制人，就有機會佔據上風。

Some critics of reflation say it will work too well. The outcome, they predict, will be capital flight, yen collapse and rampant inflation. That is conceivable, though far from inevitable. If the Bank of Japan can spirit inflation from deflation, it stands a decent chance of being able to control it. Other critics say it will not work at all. Their argument is that Japan has been aggressively printing money for years without success. That is not right either.

一些批評通貨再膨脹的人士表示，這種政策的效力太過強大，最終會適得其反。他們預計的結果是資本外逃、日元崩盤和惡性通脹。這種結果是有可能出現的，但絕非不可避免。如果日本央行(BoJ)真能神奇地化通縮爲通脹，那麼它也有不小的可能控制住通脹。還有一些批評人士認爲，這種政策毫無效力。他們的觀點是，日本多年來一直在大舉印鈔，卻沒有取得任何成果。這種觀點也是不正確的。

Under Masaaki Shirakawa, who stepped down as BoJ governor this month, the central bank made only token efforts to expand its balance sheet. Mr Shirakawa was a firm believer that Japan’s deflation was structural and could not be fixed by monetary means. Even under his predecessor, Toshihiko Fukui, the BoJ’s pursuit of quantitative easing from 2003 to 2006 was not all it seemed. In that period, the bank took a cautiously incremental approach, a far cry from Haruhiko Kuroda’s big bang this month, with his pledge to double the monetary base in two years. Japan, then, is trying something radically new.

在上月離職的前行長白川方明(Masaaki Shirakawa)任內，日本央行只是象徵性地擴大了一下資產負債表。白川堅信，日本的通縮是結構性的，不可能通過貨幣手段加以解決。即便是在白川的前任福井俊彥(Toshihiko Fukui)任內，日本央行從2003年至2006年推行的定量寬鬆也不盡如表面上那樣激進。在那段時期，日本央行走的是謹慎漸進路線，與這個月黑田東彥(Haruhiko Kuroda)搞出的大動靜有天壤之別——黑田承諾，要在兩年之內讓貨幣基礎翻番。所以說，日本正在嘗試某種全新的做法。

One concern expressed by neighbouring countries from China to Australia is that the policy’s only “transmission mechanism” is via devaluation. Their concerns are partly selfish. They worry that floods of money will leave Japan, pushing down the currency and improving the competitiveness of its exporters. In other words, Japan will simply be stealing growth from others.

從中國到澳大利亞，日本的這些鄰國表露出的一個擔憂是，該政策的唯一“傳導機制”是貨幣貶值。它們的擔憂在某種程度上是出於自身利益的考慮。這些鄰國擔心，會有大量資金流出日本，從而壓低日元匯率、提高該國出口商的競爭力。換言之，日本簡直就是在從其他國家竊取增長。

But their observation also stems from doubts about underlying growth prospects in a country with such unpromising demographics. The BoJ is massively ramping up its purchase of Japan government bonds in order to force financial institutions to recycle savings into riskier assets with higher returns. But what if such assets don’t exist? The worry is that flat or falling demand, coupled with a lack of supply-side reform, will weigh severely against future returns. Lack of opportunities at home could explain why the yen has dropped so precipitously, 20 per cent against the dollar since November. It would also suggest that Shinzo Abe, prime minister, needs to shoot his third arrow – the structural reforms intended to lift Japan’s potential growth rate.

但它們持這種態度的原因還在於，一個人口結構如此沒有希望的國家，其潛在增長前景是值得懷疑的。日本央行大幅加大購買日本國債的力度，是爲了迫使金融機構將儲蓄投向風險更高收益也更高的資產。但如果這類資產不存在呢？人們擔心，需求持平或下降，再加上缺少供應面的改革，將嚴重拖累未來的回報。國內投資機會匱乏或許正是日元匯率大幅下挫的原因——去年11月以來，日元兌美元下跌了20%。它還表明，日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)需要射出第三支箭，那就是旨在提升日本潛在增長率的結構性改革。

Before that, though, comes the question of whether the world will tolerate Japanese devaluation. Here the signs are not too bad. The International Monetary Fund said this week that complaints about competitive devaluation were “overdone”. It welcomed Japan’s “dramatic change” in monetary policy and raised its estimates for growth this year from 1.2 per cent to 1.6 per cent, and next year from 0.7 per cent to 1.4 per cent. Even some Chinese officials have cautiously endorsed Japan’s policy. (Others have been less accepting with one complaining Japan was using its neighbours as a “garbage bin”.) Still, the most likely outcome is grudging acceptance of Tokyo’s radical new measures. The world may judge that, even if there are spillover effects, it is better for everyone if Japan can get its economy going again. Tokyo’s monetary pre-emptive strike will be a lot less controversial than Pearl Harbor. And it may actually work.

但在那之前還存在一個問題，即世界是否會容忍日元貶值。這方面的跡象還不算太糟。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)日前表示，有關競爭性貶值的怨言有些“過頭了”。IMF樂見日本“大幅改變”貨幣政策，並且上調了對日本經濟增長的預期，今年的增長率預期從1.2%上調至1.6%，明年的增長率預期從0.7%上調至1.4%。就連部分中國官員也對日本的政策表示了謹慎支持。（另一些官員則持保留態度，有人抱怨稱，日本正把鄰國當作“垃圾桶”）。儘管如此，最有可能的結果仍是世界勉強接受日本激進的新舉措。國際社會可能會斷定，即便存在溢出效應，只要日本能夠使其經濟恢復增長，最終結果也還是會使所有人受益。日本在貨幣政策方面發動的先發制人打擊，引起的爭論將遠少於珍珠港事件。而且，這種政策可能真的有效。